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"UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN"-
A NOTE ON FREE SPEECH AND 
THE WARREN COURT 
Harry Kalven, Jr.* 
T HERE are several ways to give at the outset, in quick sum-mary, an over-all impression of the Warren Court in the area 
of the first amendment. The quotation in the title can for many 
reasons be taken as its trademark. The quotation comes, of course, 
from a statement about public debate made in the Court's pre-
eminent decision, New York Times v. Sullivan,1 and it carries echoes 
of Alexander Meiklejohn.2 ,ve have, according to Justice Brennan, 
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... "3 
What catches the eye is the daring, unconventional selection of 
adjectives. These ·words capture the special quality of the Court's 
stance toward first amendment issues. They express the gusto and 
enthusiasm with which the Court has tackled such issues. They indi-
cate an awareness that heresy is robust; that counterstatement on 
public issues, if it is to be vital and perform its function, may not 
always be polite. And, most significantly, they express a desire to 
make a fresh statement about the principles of free speech rather 
than simply repeat the classic phrases of Holmes in Abrams4 and 
Brandeis in Whitney.5 The Court is interested enough to be minting 
contemporary epigrams--to be making it its own. 
For a further impression of the Court's work in the first amend-
ment field, we might turn to the 1959 case involving Lady Chatterly's 
Lover in movie form, Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents.6 Chiefly 
because of an inability to agree on precisely how the court below had 
disposed of the case, the Supreme Court, although unanimous in 
reversing, found it necessary to produce six separate opinions.7 Of 
particular interest for the moment is Justice Stewart's opinion: he 
• Professor of Law, Cni,ersity of Chicago. A.B. 1935, J.D. 1938, University of 
Chicago.-Ed. 
I. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2. Meiklejohn, Free Speech in Relation to Self-Government, republished in A. 
l\lEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); cf. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note 
on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221; 
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend• 
ment, 79 HARV. L. REV. l (1965). 
3. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
4. Abrams v. United States, 250 tr.s. 616 (1919). 
5. Whitney v. California. 274 t:.S. 357 (1927). 
6. 360 U.S. 684 (19.59). 
7. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 
28-34. 
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read the court below as banning the movie because it had dealt too 
sympathetically -with adultery. In meeting this objection he was 
moved to restate the basic principle with notable freshness: 
It is contended that the State's action was justified because the 
motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary 
to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code of 
its citizenry. This argument misconceives what it is that the Consti-
tution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of 
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects 
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper no 
less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of 
ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which 
is unconvincing.8 
Again what strikes the special note is not just the firm grasp of the 
basic principle but the gallantry, if you will, of its restatement. It 
is easier to champion freedom for the thought we hate than for the 
thought that embarrasses. 
Yet another way of reducing to quick summary the special qual-
ity of this Court with regard to first amendment issues is to compare 
the opinions in Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts,9 decided in 
1967, with the opinion in Debs v. United States.10 The Debs case 
was decided March 10, 1919, exactly one week after Schenck11 had 
launched the clear-and-present-danger formula. In an opinion by 
Justice Holmes, the Court affirmed Debs' conviction (carrying a ten-
year prison sentence) for attempting to incite insubordination, dis-
loyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the armed forces and for 
attempting to obstruct tbe recruiting and enlistment service of the 
United States in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917. The overt 
conduct of Debs consisted solely in making a public speech to a 
general adult audience in Canton, Ohio. At the time he was a major 
national political figure, and in 1920 he was to run as the Socialist 
candidate for President from prison and receive over 900,000 votes.12 
The speech itself, which is summarized -i-n Justfoe Holmes' 
opinion, involved a criticism of war in general and World War I in 
particular from a Socialist point of view. It asserted, for example, 
that "the master class has always declared the war and the subject 
class has always fought the battles ... .''13 It expressed sympathy for 
several others already convicted for their opposition to the war, say-
8. 360 U.S . .at 688-89. 
9. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
10. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
11. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
12. There is a discussion of the case and its background in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH 
IN THE UNITED STATES 84-86 (1941). 
13. 249 U.S. 211, 213 (1919). 
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ing that "if they were guilty so was he."U It appears that most of the 
speech was devoted to Socialist themes apart from the war, and it 
concluded with the exhortation: "Don't worry a_bout the charge of 
treason to your masters; but be concerned about the treason that 
involves yourselves.''15 During the trial Debs addressed the jury 
himself and stated: "I have been accused of obstructing the war. I 
admit it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood 
alone.''16 
The Court disposed of the case in a perfunctory two-page 
opinion, treating as the chief question whether a jury could find that 
"one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not does not 
matter, was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and that 
the opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect 
would be to obstruct recruiting.''17 The first amendment defense 
exacted only the follmving sentence from Justice Holmes: "The 
chief defenses upon which the defendant seemed willing to rely 
were the denial that we have dealt with and that based upon the 
First Amendment to the Constitution, disposed of in Schenck v. 
United States ... .''18 The decision was unanimous and without any 
comment from Justice Brandeis.19 
Let us now jump a half century to Butts. At issue there was a 
judgment under state law in a libel action brought by a noted foot-
ball coach against a national magazine for an article which in effect 
accused him of "fixing" a college football game by giving his team's 
secrets in advance of the game to the opposing coach. The case pro-
duced an elaborate outpouring of opinions and an intricate pattern 
of votes in the five-to-four decision affirming the judgment. All 
Justices agreed that since Butts was a public figure, the reporting 
of his activities was in. the public domain and therefore the state 
libel law was subject to the discipline of the first amendment. The 
Justices divided over what level of privilege the defendant publisher 
must be given to satisfy the constitutional concern with freedom of 
14. 249 U.S. at 214. 
15. 249 U.S. at 214. 
16. 249 U.S. at 214. 
17. 249 U.S. at 215. 
18. 249 U.S. at 215. Holmes' reaction makes it evident that the clear-and-present-
danger dictum did not in his mind become a constitutional test until sometime after 
Schenck. Professor Chafee has suggested Holmes was waiting for Abrams: "Looking 
backward, however, we see that Justice Holmes was biding his time until the Court 
should have before it a conviction so dearly wrong as to let him speak out his deepest 
thoughts about the First Amendment." Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 86 
(1941). It would be a worthwhile task to explore what it meant about Justice Holmes 
that he could see Abrams but not Debs as the "clearly wrong" case. 
19. It did, however, evoke an eloquent shocked dissent from Professor Ernst Freund 
of The University of Chicago Law School. See Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of 
speech, NEw REPUBuc, May 3, 1919, at 13. 
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speech. Three separate positions were expressed: Justices Black and 
Douglas would have granted an absolute or unqualified privilege not 
defeasible by any showing of malice. At the other extreme, Justice 
Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Fortas, and Stewart, held the privi-
lege defeated by a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct con-
stituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation 
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible journalists." The 
middle ground was occupied by Justices Brennan, White, and the 
Chief Justice, who would have adhered to the- standards set forth in 
New Yark Times and thus would have held the privilege defeasible 
by actual malice-defined as "knowing falsehood or reckless dis-
regard for truth." Out of this unpromising and apparently trivial 
factual context came deeply felt essays on freedom of speech by 
Justices Harlan, Black, and the Chief Justice.20 In wondering about 
all this on another-occasion, I observed: 
This is perhaps the fitting moment to pause to marvel at the 
pattern of the Court's argument on this issue. The Court was divided 
5 to 4 on whether the constitutional standard for the conditional 
privilege of those who libel public figures is that it be defeasible only 
upon a showing of reckless disregard for truth or merely on a show-
ing of an extreme departure from professional newspaper standards! 
Further it was understood that the chief significance of the standard 
relates simply to how jury instructions will be worded. Yet this 
nuance triggered a major debate in the court on the theory of free 
speech.21 
And in speculating on why these issues held such e~traordinary 
power to move the Supreme Court-after noting that in the se-
quence of cases following New York Times the Court had located a 
novel and difficult issue involving "public speech interlaced with 
comments on individuals"-! could only add: "Second, it shows 
once again-and it is a splendid thing-that all members of this 
Court care deeply about free speech values and their proper handling 
by law. Only a concerned Court would have worked so hard on such 
a problem."22 
The difference between Debs and Butts is a measure of how 
much the Court's approach to free speech has changed over the years 
since ·world War I. And it is a difference, it will be noted, in result, 
in theory, in style, and, above all, in concern.28 
20. The details on the judicial patterns are analyzed in Kalven, The Reasonable 
Man and the First .Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 267. 
21. Id. at 307. 
22. Id. at 308. 
211. Of course, by no means is all of this difference to be attributed to the Warren 
Court, but see text part II infra. Two other recent decisions clamor for comparison with 
the Debs case: Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), where the Court enjoined the 
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But even as one acknowledges the deep concern of this Court 
for the first amendment, there is need to pause at the outset for a 
perplexity and an irony. The perplexity is one that must have 
troubled all the contributors to this Symposium: What exactly is one 
referring to when he speaks of the Warren Court?24 Are we simply 
using the Chief Justiceship as a device to mark off a span of years? 
Would it have been any more arbitrary to talk of the work of the 
Court from, say, 1958 to 1964? If we find some distinctive traits in 
that work, as both friends and critics of the Court are so readily 
prone to do in the first amendment area, to whom are we ascribing 
them? To some durable team of Justices? To the special influence 
of the Chief? The Court's roster during the Warren years has in-
cluded some seventeen Justices, and the "\Varren Court" has for 
varying periods of time numbered among its members Justices 
Minton, Burton, Clark, V/hittaker, Reed, Jackson, Goldberg, and 
Frankfurter.25 Perhaps we should adapt the old Greek conundrum 
and ask if we can comment on the same Court twice. 
I would hesitate to adopt the alternative and say that what unifies 
the topic is the distinctive influence of the Chief Justice on the 
Court's response to the first amendment. This would require not 
only that we find a distinctive pattern of decisions, but that we 
connect it up somehow to the chairmanship of the Chief-which 
seems to me to attribute excessive power to that office. 
But perhaps I am being too solemn about it all. There has in-
deed been a kind of first amendment. team: Black and Douglas have 
been on the Court during the entire tenure of the Chief Justice. 
Brennan and Harlan were appointed in 1956, and Stewart in 1958. 
And it is the analysis and response of these six Justices to the first 
amendment that I have· chiefly in mind in considering the ·warren 
Georgia legislature from refusing to seat Julian Bond for making a speech expressing 
"s}mpathy and support for the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to 
a military draft"; and United States v. O"Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) .where the Court 
upheld against a first amendment challenge the federal statute making it a felony 
knowingly to destroy or mutilate a draft card. In some respects the O'Brien case is 
reminiscent of the Court's response in Debs and perhaps indicates that no Supreme 
Court has yet acted with much independence about speech during wartime. In any 
event, one careful commentator has found the treatment of the first amendment 
issues in the O'Brien case "astonishingly cavalier." Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic 
Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 SUP. CT. R.Ev. I. 
24. It should be acknowledged that Professor Cox in his lively and lucid review of 
the Court's work was able to proceed effectively without any prefatory worries over 
the unity of the topic. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968). The book begins: "The 
appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United States in 1953 marked the 
opening of a new period in our consti.!_utional development." 
25. See the convenient chart of the Justices in _W. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAll, & J. 
CHOI'Elt, CoNmnmONAL RIGHTS AND l.mERTIJ!$, app. A (2d ~- 1967). 
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Court's reaction to free speech issues.26 At least we match here the 
rough unity of topic provided, say, by talk of the greatness of the 
New York Yankees in the middle 1920's.27 
The irony, of course, is that it is still the Warren Court-at 
least temporarily. Due to the vagaries of everyone's politics, the 
October term has opened with Earl Warren back in his customary 
center seat. The wretched controversy over the Fortas appointment 
was_ interpreted widely as an attack more on the Court as a whole 
than on Justice Fortas. The Senate was presumably providing its 
own commentary on the work of the Warren Court. And for our 
immediate purposes, it is striking how much of the Senate's concern 
was with the work of the Court in the first amendment area. There 
is a temptation to brood over the gap which appears to have been 
created between the first amendment values the Court has cham-
pioned and those the public, or a considerable segment of the public, 
will tolerate. Is there, then, a political limit on the meaning of the 
first amendment? Two offsetting considerations should, in any event, 
be noted. The Senate's free-speech grievances related almost exclu-
sively, so far as I could tell, to the decisions on obscenity and did 
not put in issue the striking work of the Court in other areas of 
first amendment concern.28 Further, such a gap between public and 
judicial attitudes may be a healthy sign. The tradition has never 
been that freedom of speech was a value to be left to majority vote; 
indeed, that may be the whole point of the first amendment and of 
judicial review under it. 
I. 
At the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago there is a 
chart which occupies a long wall and which graphs over time the 
changes in human technology. The time span is some 50,000 years, 
and the introduction of each technological advance-from the first 
crude stone used as a tool for digging to today's latest electronic or 
space age wonders-is entered on the graph. The result is a stunning 
visual impression of the acceleration of cultural inheritance. Man has 
made more major technical advances in the past 100 years than in 
the previous 49,9001 
26. It is arguable that the core of the Warren Court, at least for first amendment 
cases, has really been just the four: Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, the Chief Justice, 
and Justice Harlan. While Justices Black and Douglas have joined in the decisions, 
they have often stood some~hat apart in matters of doctrine as in obscenity, libel, and 
congressional committee sequences. -
Zl. You know-Ruth, Gehrig, Meusel, Lazzeri, Combs, Hoyt, et al. 
28. However, The Chicago Tribune, Oct. 13, 1968, carried an editorial on the 
Court entitled, "Will the Supreme Court Mend Its Ways?" which listed and expressed 
displeasure over some elevc!D decisions inhibiting the control of subversive activities. 
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There is a general analogy here to the making of law. Invention 
seems to breed invention, and precedent breeds more precedent. But 
I cite the Museum wall to make a specific point about the Warren 
Court. If one were to imagine a comparable scheme charting the 
incidence of first amendment cases from 1791 to date, the parallel 
would be striking indeed; we would get a proper sense of the ac-
celerated accumulation of first amendment precedents in the past 
fifteen years. The point is, I think, a neutral one. It goes for the 
moment not to the quality of the Court's answers but to its willing-
ness to confront first amendment questions at an unprecedented rate. 
The result is that a great part of the law, and a greater part of what 
is of interest today to the teacher or commentator, is the work of the 
Warren Court. 
Even the quickest survey makes the point. All of the constitu-
tional decisions on obscenity have come from this Court, starting 
with Roth29 in 1957; if one is interested in law and obscenity he will 
perforce find himself studying essentially the work of the Warren 
Court.30 Similarly, the constitutional law on libel has-with the 
exception of Beauharnais31 in 1952--come from this Court, starting 
with New York Times32 in 1964. And, moving to areas where there 
was some prior precedent, the impression is not much changed. 
Think what TVatkins,33 Barenblatt,34 Sweezy,35 Uphaus,36 Braden,31 
Wilkin~on,38 Yellin,39 Gibson,40 and DeGregory41 have added to the 
law on congressional investigating committees; the precedents previ-
ously consisted of little more than Kilbourn v. Thompson42 in 1881, 
ivlcGrain v. Daugherty43' in 1927, and Rumely v. United States44 in 
1953. Or, to take one final ready example, think of the law on use 
of the public forum: the major stimulus to the development of this 
body of law provided by the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1930's and 
29. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
30. See Kalven, supra note 7; Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 
Sup. CT. REv. 7. 
31. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
32. 376 U.S. 254. 
33. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
34. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
35. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
36. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
37. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961). 
38. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961). 
39. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963). 
40. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
41. DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966). 
42. 103 U.S. 168. 
43. 273 U.S. 135. 
44. 345 U.S. 41. 
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early 1940's45 has been overshadowed by the notable contributions of 
the Warren Court in Garner v. Louisiana,46 Edwards v. South Caro-
lina,47 Cox v. Louisiana,48 Brown v. Louisiana,49 and Adderley v. 
Florida.50 
Let me approach the matter a little less impressionistically. 
Taking Lockhart, Kamisar, and Choper's casebook, Constitutional 
Rights and Liberties, we can make the point in rough quantitative 
terms. The book is intensely concerned with first amendment issues, 
and the latest edition51 devotes some 340 pages to them. The editors 
rate eighty-nine cases worthy of special study; of these, a total of 
fifty-five, or over 60 per cent, have been decided by the Warren 
Court. 
There is perhaps one other way of putting into perspective how 
much the Warren Court has enriched the constitutional doctrine of 
freedom of speech, press, and assembly. It is to compare the classic 
book in the field, Chafee's Free Speech in the United States, first 
published in 1920 and republished in elaborated form in 1941, with 
the current corpus of law. A book today performing the function of 
Chafee's volume would look notably different, deal to a considerable 
degree with different principles, and confront to a considerable 
extent different problems. If the analytic density of the Chafee book 
were to be maintained, the contemporary treatment would surely 
require two volumes; and the second volume would be devoted to 
the work of the Warren Court. 
II. 
It is not feasible within the compas; of this-Article to attempt a 
systematic review of the results-the Coun has achieved in the various 
areas of first amendment law. I should prefer, therefore, to check off 
briefly some of the new ideas the Court has introduced into the field. 
New York Times may have effected a major alteration in official 
thinking about free speech. To begin with, the Court introduced 
the attractive notion that the first amendment b.as a "central mean-
ing" and thus suggested the possibility of a "core" theory of free 
speech. The central meaning suggested in Times appears to be the 
notion that seditious libel is not actionable. 
It must be admitted that the promise of radical rethinking of the 
45. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1. 
46. Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
47. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
48. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
49. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
50. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
51. 1967. 
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theory and rationale of the first amendment which this invites has 
not as yet been judicially pursued.152 The Court has been careful, 
however, to preserve the status of New York Times as a key prece-
dent.53 The Court has also made visible a new kind of problem in 
Times and its sequelae: the question of whether falsity in fact as 
contrasted with falsity in doctrine is entitled to any protection. 
This problem arises when discussion of issues in the public domain 
is interlaced with statements of fact about particular individuals. 
The issue is whether in protecting the individual's interest in repu-
tation or privacy we will give him a veto power over the general 
discussion. This was the problem in Times itself and again in Time 
Inc'. v. Hill, Butts, and Associated Press v. Walker; it looms as a 
large issue since much public discussion appears to have this mixed 
quality.54 The dilemma is a difficult one, but the Court has con-
fronted it and, to my mind, has made real progress toward a satis-
factory solution. 
Perhaps equally important is the abrogation of outmoded ideas 
by the Court; the most significant step here, I suggest, has been the 
great reduction in the status and prestige of the clear-and-present-
danger test. Immediately prior to the advent of the '\Varren Court, 
this test had a considerable claim as the criterion of the constitu-
tionality of an exercise of governmental authority over commu-
nication. In limited areas the test may still be alive, but it has 
been conspicuous by its absence from opinions in the last decade. 
Since the test-whatever sense it may have made in the limited 
context in which it originated-is clumsy and artificial when ex-
panded into a general criterion of permissible speech, the decline in 
its fortunes under the Warren Court seems to be an intellectual 
gain. 
Another major conceptual contribution of the ·warren Court 
has been development of the idea of self-censorship. A regulation 
of communication may run afoul of the Constitution not because 
it is aimed directly at free speech, but because in operation it may 
trigger a set of behavioral consequences which amount in effect to 
people censoring themselves in order to avoid trouble with the law. 
The idea has appeared in several cases, and, while the Court has not 
yet addressed a major opinion to it, it has all the earmarks of a 
seminal concept. The cases have varied in context from Speiser v. 
52. Sec note 2 supra. 
53. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hills, Butts and 
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 267, 308. 
54. This appears to be an instance of a general problem. Compare Judge Hand's 
comment on another instance of utterances with "a double aspect." United States v. 
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Kalven, supra note 7, at 11-12. 
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Randall,55 to Smith v. California,56 to Time Inc. v. Hill.51 In Speiser 
the Court invalidated a state statute requiring affidavits of non-Com-
munist affiliation as a condition for a tax exemption. The vice was 
a subtle one: as the Court understood the state procedure, the affi-
davit was not conclusive; thus the burden of proof of nonsubversion 
was left on the applicant. The Court stated: 
The vice of the present procedure is that, where the particular 
speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, 
the possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent in all litigation-
will -create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized. 
The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade 
another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far 
~vider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these 
burdens. 58 --
In Smith the Court confronted an ordinance imposing strict crimi-
nal liability on the sellers of obscene books. Again, the Court found 
the vice in the chain of consequences such regulation might en-
gender: · 
By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents 
of the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to impose 
a severe limitation on the public's access to constitutionally protected 
matter. For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge 
of the contents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to 
restrict the books lie sells to those he has inspected; and thus the 
State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of con-
stitutionally protected as well as obscene literature .... The book-
seller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship 
affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately 
administered. 59 
Finally, in the context of tort liability for "false light" privacy, -the 
Court in Hill conceptualized the problem as one of triggering self-
censorship; it thus would give the publisher a conditional privilege 
defeasible only by actual malice: 
We create grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable 
service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the 
impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in 
a news article with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly 
as related to nondefamatory matter. Even negligence would be a 
most elusive standard especially when the content of the speech itself 
affords no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. 
55. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
56. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
57. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
58. 357 u.s_. 513, 526 (1958). 
59. 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959). 
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... Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely 
negligent misstatement, even the fear of expense involved in their 
defense, must inevitably cause publishers "to steer ... wider of the 
unlawful zone ... :•oo 
The Court is thus in command of a versatile concept which repre-
sents, I think, a fascinating addition to the vocabulary of first amend-
ment doctrine. It should perhaps be acknowledged that the opinions 
in all three cases were written by Justice Brennan. 
One other potentially powerful idea of the Warren Court should 
be noted: the principle that strict economy of means is required 
when communication is regulated. It is not enough that the end be 
legitimate; the means must not be wasteful of first amendment 
values. The seeds of this notion first appeared in Schneider v. New 
]ersey,61 decided in 1939, which invalidated a prohibition against 
distributing leaflets 1vhere the governmental objective was to prevent 
littering the streets. But the idea was given its fullest expression by 
the Warren Court in Shelton v. Tucker,62 which voided a state 
statute requiring each school teacher as a condition of employment 
to file annually an affidavit listing every organization to which he 
had belonged or contributed in the preceding five years. The Court 
found that, although the state had a legitimate interest in the 
organizational commitments of its teachers, the statute gratuitously 
overshot its target. Justice Stewart stated the principle this way: 
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the 
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose 
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per-
sonal liberties when the end can more narrowly be achieved. The 
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less 
drastic means for achi~~ing the same basic purpose.il3 
It remains to be seen whether this principle, too, will be seminal. 
There is more than a suggestion in it of a preferred-position thesis. 
Legislation regulating communication may not be presumptively 
unconstitutional today, but under the economy principle it will not 
be entitled to, in Holmes' phrase, "a penumbra" of legislative con-
venience.64 
60. 385 U.S. 874, 889 (1967). 
61. 308 U.S. 147. 
62. !164 U.S. 479 (1960). 
6!1. !164 U.S. at 479. 
64. Dissenting in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926): ("But the law 
allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in 
order that the object may be secured.') There is another group of related cases deal-
ing with vagueness and requiring precision in phrasing to avoid ambiguity. See, e.g., 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, !184 U.S. 11 (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, !185 U.S. 589 
(1967); Aptheker v. United States, !178 U.S. 500 (1964); United States v. Robel, 389 
300 Michigan Law Review 
III. 
[Vol. 67:289 
The momentum of the Warren Court in other areas of constitu-
tional law has been the source of sustained controversy and criti-
cism. 65 Without attempting to assess the merits of such criticism in 
general, I should like to explore whether in the special area of free 
speech the Court's work is subject to similar disapproval. 
It has frequently been objected that the Court has moved too 
fast and in giant steps rather than with the gradual deliberation 
appropriate to the judicial process, that its opinions have often dis-
played inadequate craftsmanship, that it has failed to confront the 
issues and to rationalize its results with appropriate rigor. However, 
if we consider for a moment the work of the Court in two important 
areas--obscenity and the scope of the power of congressional investi-
gating committees-these criticisms do not appear warranted. To be 
sure there had been, as we noted, no constitutional decisions whatso-
ever on the obscenity issue prior to 1957. But that was simply be-
cause such cases had not come before the Court; there was no general 
consensus that such regulation was constitutional. In fact, there had 
long been recognized a tension between obscenity regulation and 
the first amendment. It is enough to cite the widespread praise of 
Judge Woolsey's decision and opinion in the Ulysses case66 to docu-
ment the tension generally seen between the regulation of ob-
scenity and the reach of the first amendment; by the time the 
Supreme Court entered the field in the Roth case, judges in other 
courts had explicitly noted the constitutional shadows.67 
Moreover, in Roth the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
obscenity regulation involved. In doing so, however, it recognized 
and attempted to define the constitutional limitations on such regu-
lation. While in the past decade an unusual number of obscenity 
cases have reached the Supreme Court, the sequence of resulting 
decisions can fairly be characterized as involving the gradual resolu-
tion of limited and closely related problems on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, Kingsley Pictures68 resolved the problems of thematic ob-
scenity; Butler v. Michigan69 resolved the problems of regulation of 
U.S. 258 (1967). Perhaps on close analysis the vagueness, economy, and self-censorship 
criteria can be made to converge. 
65. Cf. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and 
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government", 178 
HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964); A. Cox, supra note 24. 
66. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), 
afj'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
67. See the opinions of Judge Curtis Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. 
D. & C. 101 (1949); and the concurring opinion of Judge Jerome Frank in the court 
below in the Roth case itself, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956). 
68. 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
69. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
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general literature distribution keyed to what is suitable for children; 
and Smith70 dealt with permissible regulation of booksellers. More-
over, Manual Enterprises v. Day71 added the element of "patent 
offensiveness" to the constitutional definition of obscenity, and 
Jacobellis v. Ohio72 attached the element of "utterly without redeem-
ing significance." If there has been a jarring note, it has come not 
in accelerating the liberation of arts and letters from obscenity 
,censorship, but rather from the sudden move in the opposite direc-
tion in Ginzburg v. United States13 by adding the perplexing "pan-
dering" element to the constitutional test. 
It is true that the Court has been conspicuously unsuccessful in 
pleasing commentators or in reaching any consensus within itself as 
to how to handle obscenity cases. It is possible to detect at least six 
different doctrinal positions among the nine Justices. But this is due, 
I would suggest, to the intrinsic awkwardness of the problem rather 
than to a judicial failure to take the cases seriously or to face the 
issues squarely. In any event, the Court cannot be criticized for rush-
ing past existing precedent in order to abolish censorship altogether. 
Similarly, in cases involving congressional investigating com-
mittees, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, the Court, while recognizing a first amendment shadow, has 
inched along case by case in an attempt to develop a formula of 
limitation. Again, the sheer frequency of cases at the Supreme Court 
level within the last decade is astonishing. In a number of cases-
Barenblatt,74 Uphaus,75 Braden,76 and Wilkinson7i-the Court has 
upheld committee power and refused to inquire into the motives of 
the congressmen. In Watkins,78 despite the stirring rhetoric of Chief 
Justice ·warren's opinion, the actual decision was keyed to the tech-
nical requirement that. the pertinency of the committee's questions 
must be made clear to a witness if he is to be legally compelled to 
answer. In Yellin,79 the decision adverse to the committee rested 
simply on the committee's failure to follow its own procedural rules; 
in Gibson,80 the Court was impressed by the committee's failure to 
establish a sufficient nexus or foundation for its questions; in 
De Gregory, 81 the crucial factor was the staleness of the questions. 
70. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
71. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). 
72. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
73. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
74. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
i5. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
76. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961). 
77. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961). 
78. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
79. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963). 
80. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
81. DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966). 
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Thus far, the Court has recognized that compulsory disclosure to an 
investigating committee may inhibit freedom of speech and associa-
tion, but it has found this loss a legitimate consequence of the state's 
interest in finding facts. Moreover, the Court has managed to with-
stand the argument of four dissenters82 who have urged repeatedly 
that committee inquiries into subversion violate the first amend-
ment. Here as with obscenity the Court has not found a satisfactory 
solution to the problems posed, but it has worked at them steadily, 
with circumspection, and without taking giant libertarian steps. 
The congressional committee cases suggest one final point about 
the ,varren Court and its critics-a point on which Archibald Cox 
recently commented.83 Not infrequently the Court has been criti-
cized for usurping power from other branches of government, for 
failing to seek solutions that would ac{:ommodate the separation of 
political power in our society. Yet in the congressional committee 
cases, although the Court has made evident its distaste for the ex-
cesses of committee inquiry, it has been careful when deciding 
against the committee to place its decision on grounds that would 
leave the power ultimately in Congress. Thus if the committee fol-
lows its own rules of procedure, if it makes the pertinency of its 
questions clear to the witness, if it avoids stale inquiries, and if it 
lays some foundation for examining the particular witness, the 
Supreme Court, as matters now stand, will ratify its power to compel 
answers to its questions. 
We noted at the start that the topic of the Warren Court is an 
oblique, elusive one. Surely it would be easier to discuss straight 
away the substantive issues the Court has dealt with rather than to 
probe for some pattern of positions distinctive to the personality of 
this particular Court. Nevertheless, as we also said at the outset, 
there does seem to be a special trademark to this Court's work in the 
area of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. There is a zest for 
these problems and a creative touch in working with them. It has 
been noted that there are overtones of Alexander Meiklejohn in the 
Court's idiom. It may, therefore, not be inappropriate to turn to 
Mr. ::\Ieiklejohn for a final comment. Speaking of the principle of 
the first amendment, he once said: "We must think for it as well as 
fight for it."84 The Warren Court in its enriching gloss on the 
amendment over the past fifteen years has done a good deal to help 
us do both. 
82. See the dissents of Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and the Chief Justice in 
Barenblatt, Uphaus, Braden, and Wilkinson. 
83. A. Cox, THE '\VARRE."{ COUAT 104-08 (1968). 
84. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLIDCAL FRE£DOM 6 (1960). 
